Transaction Search Form: please type in any of the fields below.
Date: April 30, 2024 Tue
Time: 2:45 am
Time: 2:45 am
Results for agency collaboration (u.k.)
1 results foundAuthor: Great Britain: HMI Probation Title: Thematic Inspection Report: Putting the Pieces Together An Inspection of Multi-Agency Public Protection Arrangements Summary: This inspection of the of the Multi-Agency Public Protection Arrangements (MAPPA) was agreed by the Criminal Justice Chief Inspectors Group and formed part of the Joint Inspection Business Plan 2011-2013. It was led by HM Inspectorate of Probation, supported by HM Inspectorate of Constabulary. Its purpose was to assess the effectiveness of MAPPA in reducing the potential risk of harm to others presented by identified offenders in the community through joint working and the exchange of relevant information. We visited six areas and looked at a sample of cases managed through MAPPA. We examined the referral process and the plans to manage these offenders in the community drawn up at the MAPPA meetings. We then assessed the extent to which the agencies involved with the offenders took action and coordinated activity in response to the decisions made at the meetings. We also carried out a separate audit of the Violent and Sexual Offender Register (ViSOR), the database that contains information about most MAPPA eligible offenders. Overall findings -- The introduction of MAPPA placed, on a statutory basis, what previously had been a series of ad hoc arrangements for criminal justice agencies and other organisations to manage offenders deemed to present a risk of harm to others. It meant that staff in all agencies had, over time, to learn to share information and work collaboratively in order to assess and manage offenders who posed a risk of harm to the public. The subsequent development of MAPPA improved the assessment and management of these offenders. Despite the significant challenges in dealing with such individuals, the level of cooperation amongst criminal justice and other agencies, as shown by this inspection, was impressive. We found a culture of trust and openness in the agencies involved that encouraged the thoughtful exchange of information between staff working with the offenders. We also saw much good practice in the way in which staff tried to balance the needs of communities and victims with those of the offender. Given the nature of the offenders within MAPPA, it could be argued that all the cases should have been managed to the highest possible standard. Although, our findings were broadly positive, the inspection revealed a number of key areas for improvement which, in our opinion are crucial if MAPPA are to ensure that all reasonable action is taken to manage the risk of harm presented by an offender to others in the community. Lead Agency -- The national guidance, that sets out the way in which MAPPA are to operate, requires that a lead agency should be identified for each MAPPA eligible offender. We found that, despite this clear guidance, the concept of one agency taking the lead for an offender within MAPPA, whilst acknowledged by staff, was underdeveloped and did not impact on the way in which cases were managed. In practice, each agency involved with a case tended to act in isolation from one another other and used the MAPPA meetings mainly to update partners and exchange information. A clearer focus on a specified lead agency would promote a more coordinated approach to the management of each offender. Risk Management Planning -- We found that MAPPA rarely produced a comprehensive risk management plan. In accordance with the national guidance, MAPPA should agree a risk management plan for each offender subject to multi-agency management. We found that this very rarely happened in a comprehensive way. In some cases, a list of short-term actions was identified; in others, actions were too vague or simply not identified at all. We did not see any examples of a jointly agreed MAPPA risk management plan, specifying how all the relevant agencies would work together to manage the individual’s risk of harm to others, including contingency arrangements. Furthermore, actions for agencies identified by MAPPA were not always well integrated into the records of the relevant agency. Most of the cases we saw were managed through a range of restrictive interventions, including curfews, approved premises, exclusion zones and surveillance. There was little question that these interventions were necessary, but they needed to be balanced by a focus on protective factors such as involvement in positive activities and constructive interventions designed to reduce the level of risk presented by the offender in the longer term. Offender managers and MAPPA as a whole paid little attention to what would happen to the offender at the end of supervision. Active Management -- Emphasis was too often placed on information exchange within MAPPA, rather than on the active management of an offender. MAPPA meetings to review and plan work with offenders were well attended and held at the right frequency. The chairs of the meetings worked hard to ensure that all the participants were able to make a contribution. However, in many meetings, the emphasis was more on the exchange of information between agencies rather than on the development of strategies actively to manage the risk of harm presented by the offender. As a result, the chair did not always hold agencies sufficiently to account for their actions. In order to do this, chairs of meetings not only needed to be knowledgable about process and procedures, they also needed to be assertive and have well developed skills in chairing and managing meetings. Documentation Minutes of MAPPA meetings were often not fit for purpose. Minutes recording the details of MAPPA meetings were generally poorly written and presented. In many instances, there were delays in distribution and we found numerous examples of minutes that contained out of date information, or information that was wrong. Some were lengthy and difficult to read because discussions had been transcribed verbatim. In one area, the minutes contained pages of action points, whilst in others, there were almost none. As a result, the minutes were rarely used as a working tool and staff tended to develop their own recording systems. The poor quality of the minutes meant that the agencies within MAPPA would not always be able demonstrate that they had made defensible decisions in the event of a challenge. ViSOR -- We also undertook a detailed audit of the ViSOR records held on the offenders in the inspection sample. Our findings were disappointing. We found that ViSOR was not used as a shared working tool by police and probation staff, mainly because, whilst ViSOR was reasonably accessable to police staff, access by probation staff was severly constrained. In addition, the quality of the information held on the system was not always of a high standard. Conclusion -- In order to work well, all the participants in MAPPA need to work together to develop a shared view about the nature of the risk presented by an individual offender to the public, draw up a plan to manage that risk and then ensure that the plan is implemented, reviewed and updated in response to events. In this report, we identify a number of areas where these elements of MAPPA work can be improved and we make a range of recommendations to address these findings. Details: London: Criminal Justice Joint Inspection, 2011. 50p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 19, 2011 at: http://www.justice.gov.uk/downloads/publications/inspectorate-reports/hmiprob/mappa-thematic-report.pdf Year: 2011 Country: United Kingdom URL: http://www.justice.gov.uk/downloads/publications/inspectorate-reports/hmiprob/mappa-thematic-report.pdf Shelf Number: 123404 Keywords: Agency Collaboration (U.K.)Community Based CorrectionsOffender SupervisionPartnershipsProbationRisk Management |